

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIRST MEETING

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 January 1964 at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

r. P. CAVALLETTI

(Italy)

64-04097

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. D. TEHOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma

Mr. James BARRINGTON

U. SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. I. ZEMLA

Mr. T. LAHCDA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia

Ato Abate AGEDE

Ato S. TEFERRA

India

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. K. KRISHNA RAU

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO
Mr. Samuel TELLO
Miss Ofelia REYES-RETANA

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. A. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. A. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Romania:

Mr. V. DULITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. NYRDAL
Mr. P. HALLARSKJÖLD
Mr. C.G. EKLUND
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN

Mr. I.G. USACHEV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic

Mr. H. ISMAIL

Mr. AHMED OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Mr. Peter THOMAS

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the one hundred and sixty-first meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): It is a great pleasure to me to extend to the new members of this Committee -- Mr. Ageda of Ethiopia, Mr. Nehru of India, Mr. de Santiago of Mexico, Mr. Dumitrescu of Romania, and Mr. Ismail of the United Arab Republic --, and to all the others who are here for the first time, a very warm welcome. I feel sure that each of the delegations concerned will, under its new leadership, continue the valuable work which it has done in the past. As always, my delegation is also delighted to have once again in our midst Mr. Foster and Mr. Naszkowski.

I should like to join in the high tributes which have been paid to the late President Kennedy. When, God willing, the history of our times is written, the name of John F. Kennedy may well go down as one of those who played a leading role in turning the world back to the path of sanity and peace. We are highly gratified that President Johnson has pledged himself to continue the policies initiated by President Kennedy, and we wish him every success in the discharge of this human and historic responsibility.

As this session gets under way, there is general agreement that the circumstances in which we are meeting are favourable towards progress. Every speaker so far has stressed this point, and we are bound to agree. The three agreements which were concluded during the second half of 1963 -- the direct communications link (ENDC/97), the partial nuclear test ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), and the ban on the placing into orbit of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (A/RES/1884 (XVIII) (ENDC/117)) -- have produced a more propitious international climate than at any time since the beginning of the "cold war".

The improvement in the international climate has been such that the two super-Powers which for so many years engaged in a seemingly endless arms race have now decided that the time may have come to call a halt. Without waiting for an agreement to be reached on general and complete disarmament, they have begun to explore the possibility of effecting reductions by mutual example. My delegation heartily welcomes this development. There are, after all, many roads leading to our destination, and, always assuming that all unilateral steps taken by the armed Powers have as their final objective the conclusion of a universal treaty on general

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and complete disarmament under strict international control, and that the world is kept informed of all significant steps that may be taken, we believe that this new element can only bring general satisfaction.

We note with gratification that this new approach has already produced modest results in the announced decisions by the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.157, pp. 13, 14) and the United States (*ibid.*, p. 10) to bring their military expenditures for 1964 below the corresponding 1963 figures. We cannot help wishing that the cuts were substantially larger, not only because we consider the military budgets of these two States to be highly disproportionate to their actual needs, but also because of the additional factor that the impact of a small reduction in a military budget would be much less visible or detectable than a somewhat larger cut. That could be a matter of considerable importance, especially at the start of what we hope will be a continuing process, since the unilateral nature of the reductions would presumably preclude the kind of control that might be accepted in regard to an agreed reduction. However, the significant thing is that the reductions are being made; and we are encouraged by the fact that these unilateral initiatives have been followed up by the Soviet Union's proposal (ENDC/123) of 28 January that it be agreed that military budgets be reduced by 10 to 15 per cent, which we interpret to mean that the Soviet Union itself recognizes that the unilateral cuts announced fall short of what might reasonably be achieved. We hope that it will be possible to reach agreement on the Soviet proposal in the near future.

My delegation would like to see this principle of reductions by mutual example extended to other areas of the disarmament problem. There are obvious limits to the application of this principle, but we think that the possibility of applying it within those limits should be fully explored, because even moderate successes help in the general unfreezing process. We recognize that these would be unilateral measures, and if we have requested the armed Powers to keep the world informed of them, it is merely because of the universal recognition that disarmament is in the circumstances of today the concern of humanity as a whole.

Another highly encouraging development -- and a very recent one -- is what looks like an agreement in principle on a first step towards physical destruction of armaments. The Soviet Union's offer to discuss the elimination of air-force bombers (*ibid.*, p. 5), in response to informal feelers put out by the United States,

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gives us hope that we may be witnessing the beginning of something which we have long believed to be possible and for which we have been pressing ever since the change for the better in the political atmosphere.

Speaking for the delegation of Burma in the First Committee at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly on 4 November of last year, I said:

"The idea that the nuclear Powers could without endangering their security in any way get rid of what might be termed their surplus destructive capacity is, of course, not an entirely new idea. It has been talked about for quite some time now, but until the recent thaw, the state of relations between the nuclear Powers made it unrealistic even to mention it. Now that these relations have changed for the better, this being reflected not only in speeches but also in some moves, we think that the time has perhaps come for this very elementary proposition to be given serious consideration. It would be the hope of my delegation that this will be done when the Eighteen-Nation Committee resumes its work in Geneva." (A/C.1/PV.1326, p. 36)

The Burmese delegation was far from being alone in expressing that thought. Several other delegations, some of them represented in this Committee, voiced similar views. It is therefore a matter for genuine satisfaction that the idea seems to have caught on. To be quite candid, however, we did not have in mind only bombers, which, to quote from the Soviet Government's memorandum (ENDC/123) read out to us on 28 January by Mr. Tsarapkin, are "obsolete". We did not by any means exclude bombers, for the physical destruction of armaments in any form cannot but be to the good, and we recognize of course that obsolescence in this context is a relative business; but we had hoped that any agreement that might be reached might extend to some of the more modern strategic weapons and their means of delivery.

First, we feel that both sides have more of these weapons than they need and that the sacrifice of a small number would do them no harm. Secondly, while not wishing to minimize the importance of the destruction of bombers, we believe it is indisputable that the destruction of some of the more modern weapons together with the bombers would do very much more to overcome the scepticism of those who think that disarmament will never move from the realm of words to that of deeds. It would also help to meet possible suggestions that the end result might be only to

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replace bombers approaching obsolescence with more modern means of delivery -- suggestions which, however, could not be met fully without some kind of freeze on further missile development and production as proposed by President Johnson (ENDC/120), a proposal which we consider to be worthy of consideration on its own merits.

We hope that these comments, which are offered in the friendliest spirit and not entirely without appreciation of the difficulties involved, will be taken into account by the armed Powers.

In the field of nuclear disarmament, which is the heart of the disarmament problem, there has also been a significant development since our Committee went into recess at the end of August 1963. The offer of the Soviet Union to extend the so-called nuclear umbrella to the end of the third stage of the disarmament plan (A/PV.1208, provisional, p. 71) constitutes, in our view, the most important move that has yet been made in the field of nuclear disarmament since the Soviet (ENDC/2) and United States (ENDC/30) disarmament plans were submitted at the beginning of the deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. We believe it to be the urgent task of our Committee to explore the possibilities of advance which this move opens up.

Since this session began, Mr. Foster on behalf of the United States (ENDC/PV.157, pp. 10-12), and Mr. Tsarapkin on behalf of the Soviet Union (ibid., pp. 16 et seq., ENDC/PV.160, pp. 5 et seq.), have presented us with an impressive array of partial or collateral measures which they consider to be worthy of urgent study by this Committee. Some of those proposals have been carried over from the previous session, while others are new. As far as my delegation is concerned, we should be prepared to consider any of the measures proposed, because we believe that any agreements in the areas listed not only would be valuable in themselves but would also help to make for a further improvement in the atmosphere. Our views on some of the proposals carried over have already been stated, and I do not propose to reiterate all of them now.

As for the new items, we shall need further time for reflection and study; but one thing is clear: we are not going to be able to take up during this round of our discussions all the items proposed by the United States and the Soviet Union, and we sincerely trust that too much time will not be spent in discussing

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priorities. As some of our colleagues have already suggested, perhaps the best approach would be to take up first those measures on which agreements might be expected relatively quickly.

We are glad to observe that included in the lists put forward by both the Soviet Union and the United States is an item which continues to be of very special interest to the General Assembly and to the world. General Assembly resolution 1910 (XVIII) requests this Conference to continue with a sense of urgency its negotiations --

"to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time ..." (ENDC/116)

There was a time when this Committee used to devote one meeting a week to this question. Although we do not ask for that practice to be restored at the present time, the need for giving appropriate priority to the consideration of this item should be ever present in our minds.

After the Moscow Treaty and the agreement banning the stationing and orbiting in space of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the next logical move would be to take all possible steps to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. Another area which cries for action is the prevention of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack. We are aware that there are difficulties to be overcome in both those areas, but we trust that the Committee will not be deterred by those difficulties, that we shall be able to give them the urgent consideration they deserve, and that we shall be able to report progress by the end of this round of our negotiations.

We have already expressed our support for the proposed non-aggression pact between the countries of NATO and those of the Warsaw Treaty (ENDC/77), and we hope that the negotiations proceeding elsewhere will make it possible for such a pact to be concluded in the near future.

I should like to conclude with a few words about procedure. With all due respect to the views which you, Mr. Chairman, expressed as the leader of the Italian delegation (ENDC/PV.160, p. 32), my delegation feels that it must advise against a return, at any rate for the time being, to the elaboration of treaty texts, on which we were engaged in 1962. In our view the elaboration of such texts in the absence of agreement on fundamental issues is highly unproductive and, what is worse, tends to magnify the existing differences. Apart from that, my

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delegation shares the view that we need somehow to informalize our deliberations if we are going to speed up our work. The procedure we have adopted so far may have been suitable and even necessary in the early days of this Conference; but, now that we are embarking on detailed consideration of a large range of matters, it is not in our view the best way of getting results.

We should favour informal ad hoc working parties which would meet without maintaining records. We do not think that those working parties need discuss only technical questions, although we would not exclude such a provision in suitable instances. As some of our colleagues have suggested, those working parties would not report back to our Committee; rather it would be for the delegations participating in them to take up in this Committee any ideas and suggestions that might be thrown up in the informal discussions of the working parties. The composition of the working parties might, as our United Kingdom colleague has suggested (ENDC/PV.157, pp. 24, 25), be left open and variable. If such a system is to work, it will need the approval of our co-Chairmen, and we hope that they will be able to give their careful attention to the various ideas that have been put forward. It is the hope of my delegation that we shall be able to make at least a tentative start in this direction in the very near future.

Mr. ISMAIL (United Arab Republic): The United Arab Republic has followed very closely the work of this Conference since its beginning. By the end of last year we were entertaining great hopes for the achievement of general and complete disarmament and a lasting peace based on justice. Therefore I welcomed the opportunity of heading the United Arab Republic delegation in this Committee, even for a short time, to witness what we believe to be a turning point in the history of mankind.

May I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and all delegations which have addressed to me their words of welcome? On behalf of my delegation I should like also to join all my colleagues in asking Mr. Protitch to convey to the Secretary-General our thanks for his encouraging message to this Committee (ENDC/PV.157, pp. 5 et seq.).

At the time when our last session came to an end, the international situation was already filled with a new kind of optimism yet unknown in the era of the "cold war". That optimism was generated by the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty, which since then has received a favourable response, as testified to by the

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large number of States which have signed it. The welcome given to that treaty, and the enthusiastic endorsement of its political meaning as a sign of a détente, gave rise to all sorts of hopes that the tense international situation was changing at last. Indeed, a sober and accurate assessment of the after-effects of the Moscow Treaty reveals a milder tone, less bitterness, more confidence, and a disposition on the part of all concerned to bring about a change.

That new spirit of harmony pervaded also the work of the eighteenth session of the General Assembly, as manifested in the opening speeches delivered by Mr. Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (A/PV.1208, provisional, pp. 56 et seq.), and by the late President Kennedy (A/PV.1209, provisional, pp. 21 et seq.), whose untimely and tragic death was a great loss to the cause of peace. That spirit of conciliation signified a new determination of the two great Powers to move along the road to a lasting peace. That determination was substantiated by the declaration of the intentions of both Powers not to station in outer space or place in orbit objects carrying nuclear or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction (A/RES/1884 (XVIII) (ENDC/117)).

However, while welcoming wholeheartedly the détente, almost all Member States in the United Nations General Assembly made it a point at the same time to emphasize the growing impatience of their peoples for a solution of the disarmament problem. Echoing that concern, the General Assembly adopted five resolutions affecting the course of our work here and setting its main lines (ENDC/116, 117). We should feel gratified at the quick response of the two great Powers, illustrated in the voluntary and unilateral steps which materialized in the policy of mutual example and declarations made with the object of easing international tension and encouraging our work here in the search for more agreements and the enlarging of areas of possible understanding.

Thus when last year came to a close we could record achievements of great importance. We believe that during 1963 we could note a growing conviction in favour of the renunciation of war, and we could note with satisfaction a higher degree of mutual confidence in the desire of both parties to work for peace. That situation, thought in the last months of 1962 to be unattainable, should be exploited immediately and fully. It forms a solid base and a convenient point of departure for our 1964 programme in this Conference. We are convinced that we cannot be too slow when we are considering questions affecting the most vital national interests.

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On the other hand, every delay in coming to grips with the problems that face us creates further and more complicated problems. The rapid developments in almost all spheres of human activity are changing continually the interrelationship between the two great Powers, and consequently affect immensely the work of this Committee.

Therefore let us outline a plan for our work and devise a procedure for our discussions. We are of the opinion that our plan might have as its objectives:

- (1) to reach an accord on the banning of underground tests;
- (2) to agree on certain balanced measures that would contribute towards -
 - (a) halting or at least decelerating the arms race, and
 - (b) averting the danger of war; and,
- (3) taking account of the new Soviet proposal with respect to the "nuclear umbrella" (A/PV.1208, provisional, p. 71), to push forward our work on the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

In its resolution 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 the General Assembly requested our Committee to continue its negotiations to achieve the objectives set forth in the preamble of the partial Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1): that is, to seek to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" (ENDC/116). In conformity with the spirit of that resolution, my delegation finds itself in a position to appeal to the nuclear Powers to seek ways to bring to an end the differences of opinion with respect to the question of verification. In this respect we draw attention to the constructive proposals and compromise solutions suggested by the non-aligned members of this Committee during our previous sessions, the latest of which is the African joint memorandum on the cessation of underground tests (ENDC/94). However, we do not disregard the effects of probable advancements achieved recently in the systems of detection, which might help to bring about a final accord on the question of underground tests.

My delegation has always been of the opinion that collateral measures constitute the doorway to general and complete disarmament. In accordance with that belief, we have sought to provide compromise solutions by proposing the study of a series of collateral measures which, if taken as a package deal, might prove more balanced and more realistic than if taken separately. However, if circumstances show that a certain measure is ripe to be considered and agreed to independently, we should welcome such an initiative.

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We have listened carefully and with interest to the important proposals presented in the message of President Johnson addressed to our Committee on 21 January 1964 (ENDC/120). We have paid similar attention to the proposals contained in Mr. Tsarapkin's speech on the same day (ENDC/PV.157, pp. 15 et seq.) and in the memorandum of the Soviet Government of 28 January (ENDC/123).

To halt the arms race is probably a most important prelude to disarmament. Perhaps the simplest way to achieve that result would be to make a verified halt of the development and production of armaments and to shut down the plants. Nuclear weapons and their vehicles of delivery should take first priority in this respect. As a first step in this regard it would be useful to consider the following measures: (1) halting production of fissionable materials for use in weapons; (2) the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons by prohibiting accessibility to them and regulating future disposal of nuclear materials for peaceful uses; and (3) freezing the production of strategic armaments by adopting appropriate measures which should not compromise the security of either party. However, such measures by themselves cannot guarantee against a possible outbreak of war through accident or miscalculation. In this respect we can only request the two big Powers to supplement the recent establishment of the "hot line" (ENDC/97) with further unilateral and bilateral arrangements in order to cover the risks of war by accident and miscalculation.

At the same time, it is most important that we should take measures against a probable surprise attack by one party or the other. Recent memories of negotiations exploited to cloak preparation for attack are most distressing. In this regard we propose that the following measures be discussed: (1) the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of NATO; and (2) effecting a physical disengagement at the most critical and dangerous points of contact. This may be achieved by establishing atom-free zones, by immediate or gradual withdrawal of forces from foreign territories, and by the establishment of observation posts on both sides to a depth consistent with the objective in view. My delegation believes that those two groups of measures, designed first to decelerate the arms race and secondly to provide against surprise attack, are complementary and may together provide a balanced "package deal" acceptable to both the great Powers. If we could agree in principle to those measures, special working groups could then be nominated for further elaboration.

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There is no doubt that such measures, if undertaken, would result in the immediate decrease of the over-all strengths of the armed forces of both parties and, consequently, of military expenditures. However, we suggest that in those two respects the two big Powers might develop their implementation of the policy of "mutual example" by carrying out a unilateral and voluntary decrease to the extent acceptable to each. In our opinion, this would contribute to our efforts here to reach more substantial agreements which could be transformed into legally binding obligations.

I now turn to the question of general and complete disarmament. We should like to refer to General Assembly resolution 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 (ENDC/116), in which the General Assembly affirmed its responsibility for disarmament and its conviction that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control is the surest safeguard for world peace and national security. The General Assembly, having reviewed the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, called upon this Committee to resume its negotiations on general and complete disarmament in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5) and in a spirit of good will and mutual accommodation. In this respect we have noted with great satisfaction the significant progress achieved during the eighteenth session of the General Assembly.

In his statement before the General Assembly (A/PV.1208, provisional, p. 7), Mr. Gromyko stated the readiness of the Soviet Government to agree that limited contingents of inter-continental, anti-missile and anti-aircraft missiles should remain at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States in their own territories until the end of the third stage, that is, until the completion of the whole process of general and complete disarmament. We have noted also the welcome accorded to this statement by the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom in his speech on 1 October 1963 before the United Nations General Assembly (A/PV.1222, provisional, pp. 18-20 et seq.).

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This new position no doubt reveals the constructive and conciliatory trend of both sides. When it is coupled with their positions on other questions, especially with regard to force levels and decrease of conventional armaments, we have every reason to feel encouraged to request that we in this Committee should redouble our efforts to fulfil our major task, that of drafting the treaty for general and complete disarmament.

Mr. THOMAS (United Kingdom): So far this general debate of ours has been useful and encouraging. I am told it shows a marked contrast with the opening debate this time last year. As the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, pointed out, there is general agreement in our Committee that we are restarting our work in a considerably improved atmosphere. I agree, however, with Mr. Naszkowski when he says: "... conditions propitious to discussion and negotiation cannot by themselves assure success." (ENDC/PV.158, p.6). I agree with the representative of the United Arab Republic, who has just spoken, that we must exploit and seize on such favourable circumstances as exist, to direct our efforts towards more concrete action and results.

The questions are: how we can best secure action, and in what fields action can best be begun. As regards "how", the United Kingdom delegation has put forward concrete proposals for working groups (ENDC/PV.157, pp.24, 25) which have found a considerable response in this Committee. As I listened to the very persuasive speech of the representative of Sweden on 28 January (ENDC/PV.160, pp.17-20), I felt that the views she was expressing on those subjects were very close to ours. My only regret was that I realized she was expressing them far better than I myself could hope to. Like her, I had listened with attention to what had been said by other representatives on this subject, in particular by the representatives of Czechoslovakia (ENDC/PV.158, pp.15 et seq.) and Bulgaria (ENDC/PV.159, pp.16 et seq.). I agree with Mrs. Myrdal that their remarks showed us to be a good deal closer together than they perhaps imagined. I welcome this opportunity to endorse her firm assertion (ENDC/PV.160, p.19) that there can be no question of taking away from this Committee the political decisions on which both collateral measures and general and complete disarmament must be based. Nor should we countenance the use of technical discussion as a device to evade or delay such decisions. When, like Mrs. Myrdal, and Mr. Barrington this morning (Supra, p.10), we advocate the establishment of informal, ad hoc sub-groups of one kind or another, our aim is

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simply this. We believe that concrete examination of some of the more complicated aspects of our agenda will alone ensure that the decisions which must be taken in this Committee will be soundly-based decisions -- in other words, that we shall all know and agree upon what we are talking about.

We have, after all, had before us since the outset of our discussions the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) which we have all endorsed and which has been approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Our business is to put flesh -- and solid, healthy flesh -- on these bones. To follow Mrs. Myrdal's own wording, there is much on which there is already a decision in principle that one measure or another "might be worth trying" (ENDC/PV.160, p.19). If these could now be explored by an informal working group or groups, I share her belief that when the questions come back to the Committee we should be able to reach final agreement with greater speed and greater trust. If we cannot do this, a whole lot more "decisions in principle" will, I fear, take us very little further forward. What we need are "decisions in practice", and to secure these will require much hard and detailed work. We cannot and should not put the onus of such decisions on any subsidiary body. Much of the preparatory work could, in our view, be speeded and made more productive by an intelligent use of working groups.

I will now pass from the "how" of our future work to the question of what, in particular, we should aim at. Our debate has, I think, brought forward an encouraging quantity of subjects on the importance of which, if not on their precise solution, there is considerable accord.

In passing those under review, I am sure I shall have the understanding of the Committee in giving first consideration to the message addressed to it by President Johnson (ENDC/120), which was read to us by Mr. Foster, and to the memorandum of the Soviet Government (ENDC/123) which Mr. Tsarapkin read out to us on 28 January. In my speech on 21 January (ENDC/PV.157, p.23) I pledged the readiness of the United Kingdom delegation to explore in detail President Johnson's various suggestions. I know we all look forward to hearing from Mr. Foster the full explanation that he has promised us on this extremely important subject.

From every side of this Committee we have heard fully-justified expressions of concern that the graph of armaments, while we deliberate here, has not, at least until recently, shown signs of evening out -- far less of falling. We have now evidence of some cutting back, undertaken spontaneously and unilaterally, and, of course, it is very welcome. But it does not and, of course, cannot be

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expected to compare with what we shall demand in a programme of general and complete disarmament. No unilateral action can be expected to do so -- nor even any collateral action taken in advance of the establishment of progressively-expanding control, verification and peace-keeping which, as we are all in principle agreed, is necessarily implied by general and complete disarmament. In a world where that does not yet begin to exist -- where such security as we can count upon resides in a balance of deterrence -- if, even now, East and West can maintain that security while stopping further development by either side of a kind that might lead to a break-through in the vital department of nuclear weapons, and also stopping any increase on either side in the size of their confronting nuclear armouries --- if we can do this, we shall have taken collateral action of a kind which will make the partial test ban pale in comparison.

The President of the United States has presented us here with an important challenge, and we should show ourselves worthy of it. His offer is a big one, and, if we can build practical agreement upon it, the return for all humanity will be proportionately great. None of us would underrate the possible repercussions of this proposal in saving expenditure on increasingly costly weapons. But, above all, a "freeze" of this kind, if brought into effect, would mark the point of change -- the necessary halt before a rising curve can be turned into a descending one. In fact that would be truly, in President Johnson's words, to begin. Naturally, the proposal carries with it certain problems, but I am sure that, if we explore these in depth with our respective allies and here in this Committee, we shall find that there is no problem which cannot be overcome.

If I may turn now to the Soviet proposals introduced by Mr. Tsarapkin at our last meeting (ENDC/123), I think that we can find there also some encouraging signs of a will to begin. Many of these proposals are, of course, old acquaintances about which we have frequently expressed our views. But this does not mean that we will not continue to give them careful study. Perhaps I could mention a few of them which undoubtedly deserve serious discussion in our Committee.

My Government, as Mr. Tsarapkin acknowledged, has been in the forefront in calling for a start in the physical destruction of weapons. We also certainly support the United States proposals, to which Mr. Foster referred on 28 January (ENDC/PV.160, p.33), for a matched destruction of obsolete or obsolescent bomber aircraft, as a collateral measure in advance of a programme of general and complete disarmament. I am delighted that our Soviet colleague has declared that his country

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is prepared to discuss these matters. They seem to us very proper for discussion in this Committee. As I said on 21 January (ENDC/PV.157, p.23), a consideration of the possibility of making at any rate some start with the physical destruction of weapons would be a real demonstration of our determination. I am sure we listened with great interest to the constructive remarks on this subject which were made this morning by the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington (Supra, p.6)

I would also agree that a question which needs careful examination by us is the role of military expenditure in the arms race and in disarmament. The representative of Nigeria made a particular point of that (ENDC/PV.159, pp.13-15). We have all rightly welcomed the reductions announced in Washington and Moscow and have noted the value of "mutual example" in this connexion. But we are not, of course, going to attain general and complete disarmament just by "mutual example". I hope we have learnt the lesson of the 1930s.

Before the knife can cut to any depth in the staggering military budgets of today, we shall have to know, a great deal better than we do now, what announced cuts in military expenditure imply and how they can be verified. Much of the problem here is undoubtedly a technical one which seems to me a particularly apt one for examination in the kind of expert working group which we have advocated. I am sure we need not be so bound by our own procedure that we should be deterred by the question whether the matter is not more one of general and complete disarmament itself than of collateral action.

The subjects I have so far mentioned do not, of course, by any means exhaust the list of those submitted for our consideration during the current debate. In the field of collateral measures there are several others which have been suggested and which, if they have not always borne identical outward guise, may, I think, offer hope of agreement through further examination and discussion.

Let me take, for example, the question of non-dissemination. In my speech on 21 January I spoke of -

"... an agreement whereby the nuclear Powers would undertake not to allow control of nuclear weapons or nuclear knowledge to pass into the hands of third countries, and whereby non-nuclear countries would undertake not to manufacture nuclear weapons or otherwise acquire any control over them." (ENDC/PV.157, p.24)

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

The same idea was, I think, apparent in the first part of the fifth point of President Johnson's message (ENDC/120, p.2). It was also to be found both in Mr. Tsarapkin's speech on 21 January (ENDC/PV.157, p.18) and in the Soviet proposals (ENDC/123) presented on 28 January. Both Soviet statements referred to the need to close not only the direct paths to dissemination but also "secret byways"^{1/}. That last remark carried an innuendo -- in our view a quite baseless innuendo -- which was more directly developed by some of the other speakers representing East European Governments. I do not propose to go over again what has already been admirably said on this subject by you yourself, Mr. Chairman, (ENDC/PV.160, pp.30, 31), or to enter into what would probably be a sterile argument; but I will say this. We also believe that all secret byways to dissemination should be closed, and closed quickly, so that we are never faced with the hydra-headed monster to which the representative of Nigeria so graphically referred (ENDC/PV.159, p.15). In our view, the best and indeed the only way to do so is to conclude an effective non-dissemination agreement without delay. We cannot see the logic of anyone's saying that because he fears dissemination we had better have no non-dissemination agreement at all.

Another subject which, it seems, we all feel should now be tackled is the risk of war breaking out by accident or miscalculation or by an attempt to secure advantage by surprise attack. We have here the suggestion of a network of observation posts -- a suggestion which seems to us to have considerable intrinsic merit and which we, like our United States and Italian colleagues, are quite prepared to discuss, in consultation with our allies who are not represented here but would be affected by such a scheme if it were put into operation. Where we are not yet at one with the Soviet Union is, it would seem, in this: we believe there may well be intrinsic merit in the idea, while in the Soviet contention it is apparently only a conditional merit. That seems to us to be a pity. If we should find that posts to observe and report onimous movements could provide time to allow for the preparation of defence or for diplomatic exchanges -- for instance, the use of the "hot line" -- if they could do this, would they really be of no use? I think this whole question requires much further examination, and I hope that we may be able to give our attention to it.

^{1/} The simultaneous interpretation of the original Soviet statement used the expression "secret byways". In the final revision this phrase was translated from the Russian to read "indirect channels".

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

We should also examine the question of nuclear-free zones on which there was a resolution by the eighteenth session of the General Assembly (A/RES/1911(XVIII); ENDC/117). Clearly such zones can only come into existence through the will of the countries concerned, and there is not, it would seem, complete identity of view as yet in any of the zones which have been variously proposed. In the circumstances I fully associate myself with the support which has been given by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, in his suggestion that the most promising approach to the subject might be:

"... to examine the conditions which should exist and the criteria which should be applied in working out agreements on nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world." (ENDC/PV.158, p.14)

If I may refer again to the speech of our Nigerian colleague, I should also like to associate myself with his remark that a limited test ban treaty should be by no means the end of the road (ENDC/PV.159, p.12). This is, of course, a matter on which we have direction from the General Assembly (A/RES/1909, 1910 (XVIII); ENDC/116) and one that has been referred to in the messages to us of both President Johnson (ENDC/120) and the Soviet Government (ENDC/123) and by many of the speakers in this general debate. But, as the Committee is well aware, to get to the end of the road requires, in our view, a bridge not of words but of sound technical facts. Sufficient facts have not yet, alas, been forthcoming. On behalf of my Government I would meanwhile reaffirm that we are still ready at any time to take part in a committee of any size to discuss the capabilities of existing or projected detection systems to detect and identify underground seismic events.

So far I have been primarily discussing collateral measures. I think the Committee will agree that in that field there is an abundance of subjects which we can usefully and energetically pursue, even if we leave on one side, as I have done, some suggested topics on which progress seems less likely.

Collateral measures represent, however, only one aspect of our task. Listening to this debate over the last two weeks, I was glad to find it accepted on all sides that our main aim should continue to be the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. We must not lower our sights over this, even if we recognize, with our colleague of Romania, that, as he put it:

"... general and complete disarmament cannot be effected at a blow..."
(ENDC/PV.159, p.7)

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

Here we have an agenda and, I submit, we must get on with it. At the same time, however, we all recognize the central role in any general and complete disarmament of the question of nuclear delivery vehicles and the problem of nuclear weapons. Although we have discussed these already at some length, we would certainly see advantage in going back, as our Soviet colleague has suggested (ENDC/PV.157, pp.15, 16); to debate the revised proposals of the Soviet Government on what has been described as the retention of the nuclear umbrella throughout the disarmament process (A/PV.1208, provisional, p.71).

If our debate is to be meaningful and if we are to give proper consideration to those new proposals, we shall of course need to know what is proposed in greater practical detail than could have been expected from a passage in a general speech, so that we may all know what precisely we are talking about. I hope, therefore, that when the debate starts we shall be able to look for help to the Soviet delegation on this, so that we shall all be able to take a constructive part in it.

If I may end on a personal note, I should like to express my regret that parliamentary duties in London will prevent me from hearing in person -- though not, of course, from following in the records -- the final speeches in this general debate and the opening of the Committee's discussions on the specific subjects before us. The progress of the Committee's work is a subject of close and personal interest not only to me but to my Prime Minister, to the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Butler, and to all my Government. I hope that Mr. Butler himself may be here in about three weeks' time, and, of course, I expect to be back myself well before then.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 161st meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H. E. Ambassador Fr. Cavalletti, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Burma, the United Arab Republic and the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 31 January 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

